Antonio Caballero: conflicting U.S. Anti-Terrorism Law and U.S. International Bankruptcy Law by Zornes, Jordan M.
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 29 Issue 1 Article 9 
12-16-2021 
Antonio Caballero: conflicting U.S. Anti-Terrorism Law and U.S. 
International Bankruptcy Law 
Jordan M. Zornes 
University of Miami School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan M. Zornes, Antonio Caballero: conflicting U.S. Anti-Terrorism Law and U.S. International 
Bankruptcy Law, 29 U. MIA Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 328 () 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol29/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more 
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
ANTONIO CABALLERO: CONFLICTING U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM LAW 
AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Jordan M. Zornes* 
ABSTRACT 
Antonio Caballero sought retribution for his father’s kidnap 
and murder in the way Congress has made it possible: the American 
Court System. Caballero obtained a default monetary judgment 
against Colombian guerrilla forces, but as expected in collecting 
against a terrorist organization, it was an uphill battle. When finding 
attachable assets, Caballero must act fast, but in the present case, an 
international bankruptcy proceeding sought to thwart his legitimate 
efforts to satisfy his judgment. The question is: should Caballero win 
in “race to the courthouse” fashion, or does the international 
bankruptcy stay lead to an orderly distribution of assets? This note 
breaks down the merits of each argument, and ultimately offers likely 
solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Carlos Caballero was tortured daily, deprived of food and 
water, and held for ransom during his kidnapping ordeal with 
Colombian guerrilla forces.1 Carlos Caballero, for much of his life, was 
a distinguished Colombian politician and outspoken critic of those 
Colombian guerrilla forces.2 A five-time senator and former 
ambassador to the United Nations, Caballero was not just targeted for 
his outspoken critique of the Colombian guerrilla rebel groups but also 
targeted for the placement of his country farm, which would have been 
a prime route for drug-trafficking activities.3 Despite being paid a 
“substantial sum” for his return, the guerrilla forces executed Carlos 
Caballero, leaving his body on the side of a dirt road.4 
Fearing for his safety, Carlos Caballero’s son, Antonio, fled his 
home and country, leaving his property and businesses behind.5 
Antonio was granted political asylum in the United States after 
Colombian police told him they could not guarantee his safety.6 
Eventually, Antonio Caballero brought suit under the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”) in Florida State Court, alleging that the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), the National Liberation Army 
(“ELN”) and the Norte del Valle Cartel (“NDVC”) colluded to smuggle 
cocaine through the Magdalena River Valley where Carlos Caballero 
owned land and ultimately colluded to kidnap, hold for ransom, and 
kill Carlos Caballero.7 The three defendants were found guilty of 
racketeering, torture, and extrajudicial killing, among other crimes.8 
 
1 Deborah Bloom, Son of murdered Colombian diplomat gets $1 million in narco-
cash, CNN (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/americas/
narco-cash-dead-diplomat-son/index.html. 




6 Jim Wyss, Florida courts hand down $191 million ruling for Colombian 




330 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
The defendants did not respond to the complaint, and Antonio 
Caballero was granted summary judgment.9 Additionally, Antonio 
Caballero was granted a damages award in the amount of $191.4 
million against FARC, ELN, and NDVC.10 The United States 
government maintains that guerrilla and narco-trafficking interests are 
related.11 The interrelatedness of guerrilla and narco-trafficking 
interests help judgment holders, like Antonio Caballero, collect on 
their judgments because it opens a new set of funds that can 
potentially be traced back to the original terrorist group. That is, if the 
guerrilla forces are aiding the cartel in moving illicit drugs, funds 
related to the cartels would be open for collection attempts by victims 
of terrorism, such as Caballero. 
In related terrorism and drug-trafficking litigation, collecting 
on judgments is difficult due to the veiled and attenuated links 
between traceable monetary systems and the groups that are 
responsible for the wrongs committed against plaintiffs.12 Another 
FARC judgment creditor, Thomas Howes, observed on the prospects 
of collecting on his judgment against FARC that the group does not 
have “blocked assets in the US, never has and likely never will. 
[Foreign terrorist organizations] simply do not open bank accounts or 
hold assets in their name.”13 Howes further explains: “Instead, they 
operate through cartels, groups, and individual drug traffickers and 
money launderers—the agencies or instrumentalities of FARC.”14 
Antonio Caballero unearthed one such agency or instrumentality 
when linking Honduran banks Banco Continental and Inversiones 
Continental (Panama), among other Rosenthal related businesses, to 
FARC.15 Caballero presented multiple professionals who “with a 
 
9 Id. 
10 Bloom, supra note 2. 
11 Wyss, supra note 7. 
 
12 Bloom, supra, note 2 (explaining that “collecting money from a foreign terrorist 
organization – particularly an armed rebel group that tries to hide its money beyond 
the reach of US courts – is difficult especially if you’re not a US citizen.”). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Antonio Caballero’s Motion to Transfer Venue, In re Banco Continental, No. 
20-10917-RAM (S.D. Fla. Bankr. Jan. 23, 2020), ECF No. 20-5 at 23–36 [hereinafter 
Motion to Transfer]. 
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reasonable degree of certainty” could conclude that Banco Continental 
was an agency or instrumentality of FARC.16 Banco Continental was 
owned and operated by Jaime Rosenthal Oliva, his son Yani Benjamin 
Rosenthal Hidalgo, and his nephew Yankel Antonio Rosenthal Coello, 
and all were noted as specially designated narcotics traffickers 
(“SDNT”).17 Yani Rosenthal was designated an SDNT in October of 
2015 under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (“Kingpin 
Act”).18 These companies aided and abetted international narcotics 
traffickers, Los Cachiros, by providing money laundering services, 
among other services, to the cartels and their criminal organizations.19 
Los Cachiros were then linked to FARC, thus creating necessary links 
from FARC to Banco Continental and providing potential assets to 
garnish in order to satisfy the judgments.20 The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia concluded that, “for purposes of 
post-judgment attachment under the [Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(“TRIA”)] § 201(a), these entities are agencies and instrumentalities of 
the FARC.”21 These are the same defendants in Antonio Caballero’s 
garnishment action located in the U.S. District Court of South Dakota.22 
Therefore, the same inferences and conclusions about the Rosenthal 
banking organizations from the Stansell D.C. Court decision can be 
extended to the Garnishment Action in South Dakota. 
Antonio Caballero, the Stansell plaintiffs, and the Pescatore 
plaintiffs are all judgment creditors of FARC seeking to satisfy 
judgments that add up to over $500 million.23 The limited funds that 
 
16 Id. Additionally, John Robert McBrien testified to his support for Caballero’s 
original expert Bruce Bagley’s contention that Banco Continental is an agent or 
instrumentality of FARC. See Antonio Caballero’s Motion to Change Venue, ECF 20-
6 at 2–5. 
17 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Treasury Sanctions Rosenthal Money 




19 Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 10-471, 2019 WL 
4040680, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2019). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See Motion to Transfer, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
23 See Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 8:09-cv-2308-T-
26MAP, 2010 WL 11507790, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 14, 2010); see Pescatore v. Pineda, 
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can be located and legally garnished create an uphill battle for these 
judgment creditors. The limited pool of attachable assets that can be 
linked to agencies and instrumentalities of FARC create a race to find 
and to garnish those assets through court orders.24 The present cases 
of Caballero v. FARC (South Dakota Garnishment Action) and In re 
Banco Coninental create an added wrinkle, as the assets that are subject 
to garnishment are additionally sought in a Honduran liquidation by 
Banco de los Trabajadores (“Bantrab”) who has been appointed as the 
liquidating trustee by Honduran court order.25 
The United States has divided policy interests in a case such as 
this. For decades the U.S. has sought to hold terrorist parties 
accountable for their actions against American nationals as well as 
those who have been forced to flee their countries due to terrorist 
activities.26 The U.S. also seeks to respect international financial order 
by respecting international bankruptcy laws and aiding international 
bankruptcies that are filed in the U.S.27 In the present case, a Honduran 
liquidating trustee claims rights to Banco Continental’s frozen assets 
along with the FARC judgment creditors.28 
This article will examine the conflicting Congressional 
intentions created when a foreign bankruptcy proceeding conflicts 
with terrorism judgment holders’ collection efforts, and how this 
conflict is likely to play out.  Do American anti-terrorism laws support 
a winner-take-all race to the courthouse? Is this the fairest outcome 
considering the potential for similarly situated victims to be left in the 
cold? Should an international bankruptcy proceeding thwart the 
legitimate effort of a victim of terrorism’s collection on their judgment? 
 
No. 08-2245, 2018 WL 5723138, at *78 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018); see also Bloom, supra 
note 2. 
24 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-733, Agency Views, at 12 (2000) [hereinafter House Report]. 
25 See Banco Continental Petition for Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding, In re 
Banco Continental, No. 20-10917-RAM (S.D. Fla. Bankr. Jan. 23, 2020), ECF No. 1, 
at 1 [hereinafter Motion for Recognition]. 
26 See Stephen J. Schnably, The Transformation of Human Rights Litigation: the Alien 
Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA, 24 INT’L & COMP. LAW REV. 285, 
334–84 (2017). 
27 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-15-
bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
28 Motion for Recognition, supra note 26, at 1. 
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I. THE UNITED STATES’ FOCUS ON VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 
FINDING ACCOUNTABILITY 
The United States has long been invested in combating wrongs 
against its citizens as well as foreign nationals. The First Congress 
enacted the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in 1789, which has seen only 
minor changes since its creation.29 The ATS creates federal district 
court jurisdiction for torts perpetrated against a foreign national.30 
Congress has since created other laws that protect American nationals 
against terrorism.31 There seems to be a consensus in the United States 
government and judiciary that international human rights law is “to 
be treated more as a policy matter than a legal commitment.”32 This 
United States policy is embodied in TRIA, which allows  Antiterrorism 
Act and ATS judgment holders to attach blocked assets of agencies or 
instrumentalities of terrorist parties.33 
A. History of the Alien Tort Statute 
From the First Congress, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was 
enacted to provide that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”34 For 
centuries, the ATS was used rarely as a jurisdictional statute, but the 
ATS has become a “prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek 
redress in U.S. courts for human rights offenses and acts of terrorism.35 
The ATS “was intended to promote harmony in international relations 
 
29 Schnably, supra note 27, at 289 n.5 (explaining the ATS was “enacted as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, and has remained essentially unchanged since then[.]”). 
30 Stephen P. Mulligan, Cong. Research Serv., R44947, The Alien Tort Statute (ATS): 
A Primer 1 (2018),  https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44947/4. 
31 See generally Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012); see also Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (reauthorized on Dec. 20, 2019, through Dec. 31, 2027, as 133 
Stat. 2534). 
32 Schnably, supra note 27, at 293. 
33 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (2012) 
(Satisfaction of Judgments from Blocked Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, 
and State Sponsors of Terrorism). 
34 Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1. 
35 Id. 
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by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law 
violations in circumstances where the absence of a remedy might 
provoke foreign nations to hold the United States accountable.”36 
Between 1789 and 1980, only two reported decisions invoked 
the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction.37 The ATS came to the forefront 
when the Second Circuit issued its Filártiga decision, where it held that 
the ATS “permits claims for violations of modern international human 
rights law.”38 While Filártiga caused an influx of ATS litigation, more 
recent decisions have placed limits on ATS invocation.39 Sosa held that 
the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a “narrow set” of claims for 
violations of international law.40 The ATS was further narrowed in 
2013 when the Supreme Court handed down its Kiobel decision 
providing that ATS does not provide jurisdiction for claims between 
foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising completely 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.41 The 
petitioners claim must “touch and concern” the United States with 
“sufficient force” to warrant ATS application.42 Further, in Jesner, the 
Supreme Court limited the ATS from applying to foreign 
corporations.43 While the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the 
ATS in certain areas, one area where the ATS has increasingly been 
cited is litigations by U.S. victims of foreign terrorism.44 The United 
States government has shown an enduring commitment to victims of 
terrorism having a way to hold their perpetrators accountable. There 
is a balance that must be struck regarding the ATS in upholding 
international human rights and balancing the foreign policy concerns 
of potentially overstepping international norms in attaching 
international assets. 
 
36 Id. at 3. 
37 Id. at 6. 
38 Id. at Summary. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 11. 
41 Id. at 12. 
42 Case Comment, Clarifying Kiobel’s “Tough and Concern” Test, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1902 (May 8, 2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/05/clarifying-kiobels-touch-
and-concern-test/. 
43 Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2. 
44 Schnably, supra note 27, at 293. 
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In the case of Antonio Caballero, Caballero was able to use the 
ATS, as a resident alien and victim of a tort in violation of the law of 
nations, to hold FARC, ELN, and NDVC accountable for the atrocity 
that was committed against Caballero’s father. The defendants in the 
lawsuit kept themselves absent and did not challenge Caballero’s 
claims resulting in a default judgment.45 This default judgment must 
have assets to attach, and TRIA allows the attachment of blocked 
assets. 
B. The Antiterrorism Act 
The Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2331, 
establishes a cause of action for any U.S. national, and only a U.S. 
national, who has been injured by an act of international terrorism.46 
The ATA is different from the ATS, which is a jurisdictional statute 
that grants the U.S. district courts jurisdiction.47 While the ATA does 
establish jurisdiction in the federal courts for a claim by U.S. nationals, 
it also creates a cause of action, which distinguishes the ATA from the 
ATS.48 International terrorism is defined as violent or dangerous acts 
intended to intimidate a civilian population in violation of U.S. 
criminal law.49 This civil liability created by the ATA can extend to 
“donors and supporters of terrorism” as well as service providers such 
as banks that provide material support to terrorist parties.50 In 2016 
Congress expanded civil liability under the ATA to any person 
“knowingly or recklessly contribut[ing] material support or resources” 
to a person posing a “significant risk” of committing acts of terrorism 
pursuant to the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).51 
The ATA provides for treble damages, which helps plaintiffs 
attract attorneys to fight their cause, but it also is said to aid in the fight 
 
45 Wyss, supra note 7. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
47 Alison Bitterly, Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer 
Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3389, 3398 (2015). 
48 Id. at 3389. 
49 Schnably, supra note 27, at 335. 
50 See Olivia G. Chalos, Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act: The Mental State 
Requirement Under § 2333(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 324–25 (2016). 
51 See Schnably, supra note 27, at 369. 
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against terrorism by attacking the funding that keeps terrorist 
activities occurring.52 
The Stansell Plaintiffs, et al. brought suit in the Middle District 
of Florida citing the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which 
provides: 
(a) Action and jurisdiction.—Any national of the 
United States injured in his or her person, property, or 
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue 
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United 
States and shall recover threefold the damages he or 
she sustains and the cost of the suit, including 
attorney’s fees.53 
In their lawsuit the Stansell plaintiffs allege FARC shot down 
their reconnaissance aircraft, assassinated the pilot, and took the other 
flight members captive for five years.54 The Stansell Plaintiffs 
established that “no sovereign immunity or act of war exceptions to 
the ATA apply” in that instance.55 Again, the FARC defendants did not 
appear and were subject to a default judgment of $318,030,000.56 The 
Court’s decision ended with the explanation that “inasmuch as the 
FARC used profits from the manufacture and distribution of cocaine, 
money laundering, and extortion to support their terrorist acts, 
Plaintiffs [have] perfected liens on proceeds derived from these related 
offense criminal activities.”57 
Pescatore et al. plaintiffs also brought suit against FARC and 
Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera Pineda (“Simon Trinidad”), a high 
ranking member of FARC, under the ATA in 2008.58 Frank Pescatore, 
while working as a geologist in Colombia, was kidnapped, held for 
 
52 Id. at 336. 
53 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 
54 Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom. (FARC), No. 8:09-cv-2308-T-
26MAP, 2010 WL 11507790, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 14, 2010). 
55 Id. at *2. 
56 See Id. at *2-4. 
57 Id. at *4. 
58 Pescatore v. Pineda, 345 F. Supp. 3d *68, *69–70 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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ransom, and eventually killed.59 The perpetrators were members of 
FARC who had shot Mr. Pescatore upon his attempted escape.60 In the 
Court’s conclusion, U.S. District Judge Collyer found that, while FARC 
and Simon Trinidad do not exist in the same fashion they did at the 
time of Mr. Pescatore’s kidnapping and murder, and “there is no one 
left to punish,” the law endeavors to provide the solace that other 
remedies would perform by awarding monetary damages.61 The 
Pescatore plaintiffs were awarded $69,000,000 after their damages 
were trebled.62 
C. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
Beyond the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 
and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, the insurance agencies did 
not view terrorism as a risk that should be considered in underwriting 
commercial insurance policies.63 In the aftermath of the September 
11th terrorist attack, the insurance industry saw losses that were 
double the largest loss in history up to that point.64 Some estimates of 
the losses in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack total $47 billion in 
2019 dollars.65 The reduced availability of insurance protecting against 
acts of terrorism began to cause a strain on the U.S. economy.66 This 
led to a change in the way the insurance industry viewed terrorism.67 
The insurance industry believed terrorism losses were unsustainable 
and uncertain when considering how large the risk exposure was, and 
therefore, decided terrorism was an uninsurable risk. The insurance 
industry sought federal intervention, and shortly thereafter the 
 
59 Id. at *69. 
60 Id. at *70. 
61 Id. at *78. 
62 See id. 
63 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_terrorism_risk_insurance_act_tria.htm (last 
updated Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter NAIC]. 
64 Jeffrey E. Thomas, The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act – An Industry-Government 
Partnership, 38 BRIEF 24, 24 (2009). 
65 Background on: Terrorism risk and insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorism-risk-and-insurance. 
66 NAIC, supra note 64. 
67 See id. 
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 was passed by Congress and 
signed into law by President Bush.68 
Originally created as a temporary three-year federal program 
that would allow the federal government to share monetary losses 
with insurers due to losses from a terrorist attack, the Act has been 
renewed four times since.69 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act allows 
for attachment of blocked assets.70 Under section 201 of TRIA, where 
a: 
person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist 
party on a claim based on an act of terrorism, or for 
which a terrorist party is not immune . . . the blocked 
assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked 
assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist 
party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid 
of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the 
extent of any compensatory damages for which such 
terrorist party has been adjudged liable.71 
As Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson noted in Stansell v. 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, TRIA promotes “race to the 
courthouse” style proceedings due to the fact that “a number of events 
may occur which make satisfaction using a particular asset 
impossible.”72 These occurrences may be the government making the 
assets unreachable by “seizure or de-listing of the alleged agency or 
instrumentality,” but also that a fellow judgment creditor may seek to 
satisfy their own judgment by garnishing the relevant account.73 
As evidenced by the enacting of statutes such as the ATS, the 




70 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (Satisfaction of 
Judgments from Blocked Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, and State 
Sponsors of Terrorism). 
71 Id. § 201(a). 
72 Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, 771 F.3d 713, 729 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
73 Id. 
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Congressional action to terrorists being held accountable for the harms 
they commit. 
It is now established that the competing default judgment 
plaintiffs, Caballero, the Pescatore plaintiffs, and the Stansell plaintiffs 
have received judgments under the ATS and ATA respectively, and 
they are allowed to execute on assets of agencies or instrumentalities 
of FARC pursuant to TRIA section 201(a).74 
D. Further Congressional Action Showing a Policy in Favor 
of Anti-Terrorism Law 
During the 1990s, President Clinton exercised his presidential 
waiver of authority conferred by section 117 of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), blocking default judgment holders from 
attaching diplomatic property and frozen assets in satisfaction of their 
claims against Cuba and Iran.75 The House of Representatives sought 
to override this presidential waiver and allow the satisfaction of these 
default judgments from frozen assets of the responsible State.76 The act 
was called the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (“JVTA”), which 
ultimately was not passed into law.77 Congress was not deterred and 
sought further legal assistance outlined for victims of terrorism. 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
Flatow Amendment both signify a further push in fighting terrorism 
by amending the FSIA to bar sovereign immunity for state sponsors of 
terrorism.78 Under the amended section 1610(a)(7) of the FSIA a 
foreign state’s property may not be immune from execution for a 
judgment that was covered under section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.79 The 
Flatow Amendment additionally allows an official or agent of a 
foreign state on the state sponsor of terrorism list to be liable for injury 
 
74 Id. at 722. 
75 Jennifer K. Elsea, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. RL 31258 11–12, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2008). 
76 Id. at 12. 
77 Id. 
78 Schnably, supra note 27, at 344. 
79 Id. at 345. 
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to a U.S. citizen while the official or agent is acting within their scope 
of employment.80 
Following these changes, Congress further amended the FSIA 
in 2008 through the National Defense Authorization Act.81 In these 
changes, we see that Congress answered ambiguities in the 1996 FSIA 
amendments by “expressly creating a cause of action against foreign 
states for terrorism.”82 The amendment also found that property of a 
foreign state or an agency of a foreign state could be used to satisfy a 
judgment creditor’s claim.83 
E. The Office of Foreign Asset Control 
The Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) is a department 
of the U.S. Treasury charged with enforcing economic and trade 
sanctions imposed by the U.S. against countries and groups of 
individuals.84 Typically, OFAC’s sanctions are imposed on countries 
and groups that are involved in foreign aggression, terrorist activities, 
and narcotics sales, among other acts.85 OFAC enforces sanctions that 
were imposed by the U.S. government based on its foreign policy and 
national security objectives.86 These policies are aimed at foreign 
nations, terrorists, and narcotics traffickers who pose a threat to the 
national security or economy of the United States.87 
OFAC’s activities are authorized by Congressional legislation, 
however, the president of the United States can use emergency powers 
to freeze foreign assets falling under U.S. jurisdiction.88 The OFAC 
policies are intended to disrupt the economies and everyday activities 
of the groups that are involved in sanctionable activities.89 
 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 358–59. 
82 Id. at 359. 
83 Id. 
84 Will Kenton, Office of Foreign Assets Control, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
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In the present case, the Rosenthal family businesses (Banco 
Continental, Inversiones Continental (Panama), etc.) were subject to 
OFAC sanctions and asset freezing due to their activities in aiding and 
abetting narcotics trafficking into the United States.90 As an OFAC 
designated SDNT, Banco Continental’s assets were considered 
blocked for TRIA purposes.91 OFAC grants specific licenses granting 
authorization to engage in a transaction that would be prohibited.92 
This license would allow the release of blocked funds.93 Banco 
Continental previously had these licenses until 2017 when the last 
license expired.94 
Provisions that allow the attachment of blocked assets seem to 
conflict with OFAC’s power to block the assets of terrorists and 
narcotics traffickers. However, TRIA allows plaintiffs to execute 
judgments for compensatory damages on “blocked assets of that 
terrorist party” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”95 
Caballero claims the notwithstanding provision is a clear statement 
that TRIA is “second to no law.”96 This provision, however, may not 
quite mean what it says. Simply citing the notwithstanding provision 
is insufficient to determine which of multiple statutory provisions 
control in certain circumstances.97 For instance, a court held that 
 
90
 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note 18. 
91 Stansell, 771 F.3d at 723. 
92
 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., OFAC Consolidated Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/frequently-asked-questio
ns/ofac-consolidated-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) (answered 
in Frequently Asked Question number 7) [hereinafter OFAC FAQ]. 
93 Id. 
94 Motion for Recognition, supra note 26, at 16. 
95 Mark G. Hanchet & Christopher J. Houpt, Recent TRIA Decision Could Ease 
Garnishment Burden, MAYER BROWN (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.mayerbrown.com
/en/perspectives-events/publications/2013/12/recent-tria-decision-could-ease-
garnishment-burden#_ftn1. 
96 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, or Alternatively, to Stay, and Incorporated 
Memorandum of Law at 5–6, Wells Fargo, N.A. v. Caballero, No. 20-cv-20868-CMA 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2020), ECF No. 37. 
97 See Larry M. Eig, Congr. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General 
Principles and Recent Trends 39? (Sep. 24, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-
589.pdf. In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, the court said, “We have 
repeatedly held that the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other law’ is not always 
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“directive to proceed with timber sale contracts ‘notwithstanding any 
other provision of law’ meant only ‘notwithstanding any provision of 
environmental law,’” which forced the Forest Service to comply with 
other federal law requirements that may be conflicting.98 
Southern District of New York courts specifically have 
endorsed two different readings of this “notwithstanding” provision 
in the TRIA collection program.99 One S.D.N.Y. court ruled the 
“notwithstanding” provision applies to other relevant federal statutes 
or regulations rather than all law.100 Another S.D.N.Y. court held the 
opposite, that the notwithstanding provision of TRIA law meant 
exactly what it says; that it preempts all provisions of law that may 
block an asset from a TRIA judgment creditor.101 Later, in Harrison v. 
Republic of Sudan, the Second Circuit explained, “[o]nce a district court 
determined that blocked assets are subject to the TRIA, those funds 
may be distributed without a license from OFAC.”102 Therefore, it is 
unclear that TRIA asset collection laws supersede all law in addition 
to debtor bankruptcy protection. 
With regards to potential de-listing of the SDNT by OFAC, the 
de-listing does not retroactively affect the garnishment action 
instituted by plaintiffs.103 OFAC regulations delineate the result in that 
situation: 
Any amendment, modification, or revocation . . . of any 
order, regulation, ruling, instruction, or license issued 
by . . . [OFAC] shall not, unless otherwise specifically 
provided, be deemed to affect . . . any civil or criminal 
 
construed literally . . . and does not require the agency to disregard all otherwise 
applicable law.” 92 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1996). 
98 See EIG, supra note 98 (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council, 92 F.3d at 
792). 
99 Hanchet & Houpt, supra note 96. 
100 Calderon-Cardona v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 867 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
101 Levin v. Bank of New York, No. 09-CV-5900 RPP, 2011 WL 5312502, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2013). 
102 Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 802 F.3d 399, 409 (2d Cir. 2015) (reversed and 
remanded by Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S.Ct. 1048 (2019) on service of 
process grounds). 
103 Stansell, 771 F.3d at 732. 
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suit or proceeding commenced or pending prior to such 
amendment, modification or revocation.104 
Thus, should Mr. Caballero have seen his garnishment action 
to fruition, the de-listing of the SDNTs and unblocking of assets would 
not have affected his rights to the assets. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy 
proceeding filed by Banco Continental stood in the way of Caballero’s 
garnishment proceeding. 
F. The Creation of a Race to the Courthouse 
The race to the courthouse is a “first to file” rule that, taken to 
its ultimate limit, is about filing “a fraction of a second sooner than the 
competition” in order to gain various advantages such as selecting a 
favored choice of forum.105 In the cases where there was a race to the 
courthouse, certain parties had favored rights that had nothing to do 
with the merits of their respective cases.106 In the Second Circuit, the 
first-filed rule states “where there are two competing lawsuits, the first 
suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of 
convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second.”107 
This is not about forum shopping, but about substantially similar 
actions that are filed in federal court having comity amongst the courts 
where the first-filed action takes precedence and the second-filed 
action may be dismissed.108 The rule provides that when “actions 
involving nearly identical parties and issues have been filed in two 
 
104 Id. at 732–33. 




107 Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 16-MC-405 ALC, 2020 
WL 1158086, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020). 
108 John E. Goodman, Dealing with Competing Class Actions, Part One – Race to 
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344 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
different district courts,” the court where the first suit is filed proceeds 
to judgment.109 
In this case, Antonio Caballero’s South Dakota Garnishment 
Action is the first filed action that seeks garnishment of the Wells Fargo 
blocked assets located in South Dakota.110 In a faceoff between the 
fellow judgment creditors, Stansell and Pescatore, Caballero would 
have the first bite of the apple and would likely take the full amount 
of the Banco Continental blocked funds because the blocked funds do 
not come close to fully satisfying Mr. Caballero’s original judgment. 
Often, when Congress acts to allow terrorism victims to obtain 
judgments against the perpetrators of their injuries, the collection 
efforts create a race to the courthouse by virtue of the limited pool of 
assets the victims are able to connect to the terrorist party.111 This “race 
to the courthouse” has been an issue according to the executive office 
when Congress heard testimony on the efficacy of the JVTA that 
passed the House in 2000 but ultimately failed.112 
Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat testified at the 
House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Claims about the Clinton Administration’s views on the passing of the 
Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2000.113 Mr. Eizenstat 
recognized that, while the Administration and House shared a 
common goal in seeking retribution for those that are victims of 
terrorism, they see different ways of carrying out that end.114 The 
Deputy Secretary outlined five “principal negative effects” that an act 
allowing victims of terrorism to satisfy judgments from a State’s frozen 
assets would not promote fairness and U.S. interests abroad.115 
Specifically, in his third “negative effect,” Deputy Secretary Eizenstat 
explained the executive’s belief that an act like the JVTA would create 
a “race to the courthouse benefiting one small, though deserving, 
group of Americans over a far larger group of deserving 
 
109 Goodman, supra note 109. 
110 Motion to Transfer, supra note 16, at 2. 
111 See generally House Report, supra note 25, at 12 
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113 Id. at 10–21. 
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Americans.”116 Eizenstat explains the executive branch’s concern that 
the JVTA would “frustrate equity among U.S. nationals with claims 
against terrorism-list states.”117 He recognizes the arbitrariness of the 
“winner-take-all” race that would be created.118 Therefore, the 
satisfaction of claims would not be based on justice or who is 
deserving, but based on who got in line or found assets first. He 
specifically cites Alejandre, Flatow, and Anderson cases, which brought 
about the JVTA, as a few of many claims brought by U.S. nationals 
against Cuba and Iran.119 This recognition means that, while these are 
the notable cases, there are many more claims that would be left 
unsatisfied if only a small group is able to fully satisfy their claims. 
This is one example of the recognition of what happens to fellow 
claimants when federal terrorism acts allow the satisfaction of claims 
through blocked assets. 
In the end, the U.S. Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, “which permitted certain victims 
of terrorist acts to collect 100% of their compensatory damages from 
the United States government.”120 In regard to Flatow, the plaintiffs 
were still allowed to execute garnishments in collection of his punitive 
damages award via the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act of 2000.121 
This is exemplified in the present case where, should Caballero 
collect the full amount of the Wells Fargo blocked assets, the Pescatore 
and Stansell judgment holders will be left to look elsewhere to satisfy 
their judgments. They would be left with nothing of the limited pool 
of frozen assets from Rosenthal’s businesses. Instead of allowing this 
“race to the courthouse” style of proceeding, Congress would have to 
take legislative measures to change the inter-judgment creditor 
competition. Congress may attempt to create a fund to pay for the 
claims of victims of terrorism in a similar method to the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act where the U.S. government 
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satisfied claims. This may foster fairer conclusions to judgment 
creditor races. 
Ultimately, in the South Dakota Garnishment Action, the court 
denied the fellow judgment creditor’s attempt to intervene because the 
judgment creditors failed to show an injury in fact for standing 
purposes.122 The Stansell and Pescatore judgment creditors are still able 
to execute garnishment proceedings against other agencies and 
instrumentalities of FARC. 
Regarding Caballero’s garnishment action and Banco 
Continental’s foreign proceeding, Antonio Caballero claims that the 
first-to-file rule applies because his South Dakota Garnishment Action 
was filed prior to Banco Continental’s foreign bankruptcy 
proceeding.123 Citing In re Rohalmin, Caballero argues that their South 
Dakota action was filed first and actions in the Southern District of 
Florida should be transferred to South Dakota out of comity and the 
similarity of the issues presented in each case.124 In that case, the 
trustee claimed the “Dealership Defendants” had transferred their 
dealership operations to new parties in order to avoid FLSA and tax 
liabilities.125 Some of the defendants claimed there was a pending case 
in Virginia with largely the same parties and issues that was an 
appropriate and first-filed case.126 Quoting First Equitable Realty, III, 
Ltd. v. Dickson, the defendants argued that “[w]here two actions 
involving overlapping issues and parties are pending in two federal 
courts, there is a strong presumption across the federal circuits that 
favors the forum of the first-filed suit under the first-filed rule.”127 
“Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit requires that the party objecting to 
jurisdiction in the first-filed forum carry the burden of establishing 
“compelling circumstances” to warrant an exception to the first-filed 
 
122 Order Denying Motion to Intervene, Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Columbia, No. 4:19-cv-04011-KES, (D.S.D. Jan. 18, 2019), ECF 
23, at 18. 
123 Motion to Transfer, supra note 16, at 13 (citing Dilworth (sic), 598 B.R. at 904 
(likely citing In re Rohalmin, 598 B.R. at 905)). 
124 Motion to Transfer, supra note 16, at 13. 
125 In re Rohalmin, 598 B.R. at 902–03. 
126 Id. at 903. 
127 Id. at 905. 
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rule.128 That court did in fact transfer the case to the Eastern District of 
Virginia.129 
Banco de los Trabajadores, in their response to Antionio 
Caballero’s Motion to Transfer,  claim the first to file rule does not 
apply at all.130 Bantrab cites a Southern District of Florida opinion 
explaining the application of the first-filed rule, which considers “(1) 
the chronology of the two actions, (2) the similarity of the parties, and 
(3) the similarity of the issues.”131 Bantrab argues the first-filed rule 
makes no sense in the bankruptcy context.132 In that case, the plaintiffs, 
Lori Laskaris and Daniel Laskaris, filed a putative class action against 
Fifth Third Bank alleging usury claims and breach of contract. In the 
same case, another group of plaintiffs, the Klopfenstein et al. plaintiffs, 
had filed a case in the Northern District of Ohio over six months 
prior.133 Klopfenstein v. Fifth Third Bank had been transferred to the 
Southern District of Ohio as the most convenient venue.134 Ultimately, 
the Southern District of Florida dismissed and transferred the Laskaris 
case to the Southern District of Ohio as the first-filed court, which 
allows the first-filed court to decide “[w]hether or not both cases 
should proceed independently” or not.135 
Laskaris v. Fifth Third Bank did not deal with plaintiffs that 
claimed rights to assets that were also assets claimed in the course of a 
bankruptcy proceeding where a liquidating trustee sought rights to 
the assets for their orderly distribution. The United States approach to 
bankruptcy allows for the orderly distribution of assets, which is in 
direct conflict with the race-to-the-courthouse style of garnishment 
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130 See Memorandum in Opposition to Antonio Caballero’s Motion to Transfer, In re 
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II. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY AND 
THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
The United States added chapter 15 to the Bankruptcy Code 
with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005.136 Chapter 15 is the U.S. domestic adoption of the Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency created by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law. Chapter 15 replaces section 
304 of the Bankruptcy Code.137 The purpose of chapter 15 is to 
“provide effective mechanisms for dealing with insolvency cases 
involving debtors, assets, claimants, and other parties of interest 
involving more than one country.”138 The primary objectives of 
chapter 15 include: 
(1) “cooperation between United States courts, the 
United States Trustee, and United States debtors on the 
one hand, and the courts and other competent 
authorities of foreign countries on the other hand; (2) 
greater legal certainty for trade and investment; (3) fair 
and efficient administration of cross-border 
insolvencies; (4) preserving and maximizing the value 
of the foreign debtor’s assets; and (5) facilitating the 
rescue of financially troubled businesses.139 
Chapter 15 further provides: 
”The bankruptcy court may, at the request of the 
foreign representative, grant provisional relief 
pending entry of an order granting the petition for 
recognition such as: (1) staying execution against the 
debtor’s assets located in this country; (2) allowing the 
foreign representative to administer assets located in 
 
136 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, supra note 28. 
137 Chapter 15 Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE at 1,  https://www.justice.gov/
ust/file/volume_6_chapter_15_case_administration.pdf/download (last visited Feb. 2, 
2021) (from the United States Trustee Program Policy and Manual). 
138 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, supra note 28. 
139 Chapter 15 Administration, supra note 138, at 1. 
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this country; (3) providing for the examination of 
witnesses or the gathering of evidence regarding the 
debtor’s assets, affairs, rights, obligations, or liabilities; 
or (4) suspending or allowing the avoidance of certain 
transfers.140 
Regarding number (4), the provisional relief must be “urgently 
needed to protect the debtor’s assets or the interest of creditors.”141 
Chapter 15 has a mandatory recognition rule where the bankruptcy 
court must, after notice and a hearing, enter an order recognizing the 
foreign proceeding if the foreign proceeding and the foreign 
representative meet chapter 15’s definitional requirements and the 
filing requirements provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 1515 are satisfied.142 A 
bankruptcy court may refuse to recognize a foreign proceeding if 
recognition would be “manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy.143 As 
stated earlier, a key bankruptcy provision is the automatic stay that 
applies to property of the debtor located in the United States, and 
prohibits actions against the debtor’s property.144 The automatic stay 
applies once the bankruptcy court enters an order granting recognition 
of the of the proceeding.145 The automatic stay stops the South Dakota 
Garnishment Action initiated by Antonio Caballero and protects the 
Banco Continental frozen assets should they be deemed property of 
the bankruptcy estate.146 
In the case this note is based on, Banco Continental, after being 
accused of supporting drug trafficking, was ordered to undergo 
“forced liquidation” by the National Banks and Securities Commission 
(“CNBS”) of Honduras.147 Bantrab was declared the liquidating trustee 
for Banco Continental.148 Grupo Continental, the parent organization 
 
140 11 U.S.C. § 1519. 
141 See Chapter 15 Administration, supra note 138, at 1. 
142 Id. at 2. 
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144 11 U.S.C. § 1520. 
145 Chapter 15 Administration, supra note 138, at 2. 
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147 Michael Lohmuller, Honduras Closes Bank as Elite Money Laundering Case Hits 
Savers, Insight Crime (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/hond
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of Banco Continental, claimed that a “forced liquidation would 
‘impede’ Grupo Continental . . . from being able to pay its outstanding 
invoices and its more than 11,000 employees[.]”149 Grupo Continental 
claimed this would not occur with a voluntary liquidation.150  
The prior history of the case is important in understanding 
how and why the chapter 15 foreign bankruptcy proceeding was 
initiated. Banco Continental held over fourteen (14) million dollars of 
assets in the United States, and these assets were ordered blocked 
“[p]ursuant to regulations promulgated by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control” (“OFAC”) and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Regulations 
and held by Wells Fargo.151 The Rosenthal Family were found to have 
supported terrorist organizations such as FARC, the National 
Liberation Army, the Norte del Valle Cartel, among others by money 
laundering and other services in support of international narcotics 
trafficking.152 The asset blocking designation recognizes that the 
Government of Honduras initiated liquidation proceedings against 
Banco Continental, and that Banco Continental was under the control 
of the Honduras Government and a government-appointed 
liquidator.153 The OFAC Designation Article also notes that “a 
transaction to liquidate or wind down Banco Continental S.A. involves 
a U.S. person, including a U.S. financial institution, or is within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, that transaction would be prohibited 
unless authorized by OFAC.”154 Thus, Wells Fargo was prohibited 
from relinquishing the funds from their control without OFAC 
authorization. 
Wells Fargo then filed an interpleader action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to adjudicate 
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who had rights to these funds.155 As the Wells Fargo Interpleader 
Action notes, in late 2015, Bantrab, as liquidating trustee of Banco 
Continental, received an OFAC license to wind down Banco 
Continental’s assets, but the license did not allow for the unblocking 
of property blocked pursuant to Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
sanctions.156 
As the South Dakota garnishment action was winding down, 
Banco Continental was forced to file a Petition for Recognition in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1517. Bantrab realized they were late to the party and losing the “race 
to the courthouse,” and by filing the foreign bankruptcy proceeding, 
Bantrab sought the protection of the automatic stay while they sought 
other venues for collecting the frozen assets.157 Thus, the garnishment 
action in South Dakota could not be completed due to the injunction 
thwarting actions against the property of Banco Continental, assuming 
the property was still Banco Continental’s and therefore property 
under the control of the liquidating trustee, Bantrab. With the 
“recognition of a foreign main proceeding, actions against the debtor 
and its property are stayed, transfers outside the ordinary course of 
business must be approved by the court recognizing the foreign 
proceeding, and parties holding assets of the debtor may be subject to 
turnover orders. . . .”158 
A. Which Law Supersedes? 
The question remains, which law supersedes and dictates the 
distribution of Banco Continental’s funds controlled by Wells Fargo? 
The United States has significant interests in protecting international 
bankruptcy proceedings as they respect comity with other nations in 
the turnover of assets rightfully controlled by entities of those nations. 
In the present case, the Government of Honduras seeks the turnover 
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of the Banco Continental assets in order to satisfy Banco Continental 
creditors that may not have been involved in the Rosenthal money 
laundering organization. At the same time, the United States has a 
significant interest in protecting judgment holders who have been the 
victims of international terrorist acts. The latter has been an ongoing 
dedicated policy matter of Congress for decades. In reviewing the 
ATS’s original enactment in 1789, Congress has attempted to give 
victims of terrorism and other torts the ability to hold those 
accountable for centuries. 
Bankruptcy cases are filed to thwart the actions of aggressive 
creditors who aim to fully collect on what is owed to them at the 
expense of other creditors. Caballero’s garnishment action is the exact 
type of action the automatic stay provision is meant to halt. Bantrab 
must file a foreign proceeding in order to carry out their duties as 
liquidating trustee of Banco Continental’s assets. 
B. Case Outcomes 
There are many conclusions that can be reached in the 
immediate case. The judgment creditors can split the Banco 
Continental assets in a settlement. Banco Continental was the original 
asset holder, and, as liquidating trustee, Bantrab takes over the mantle 
of holder of the frozen assets. The three respective judgment creditors 
all have a right to assets that belong to an agent or instrumentality of 
FARC. This would likely be the fairest outcome where those that have 
been wronged by FARC are able to, in a shared manner, recover a 
small portion of their greater default judgments as well as Banco 
Continental’s creditors obtaining a portion of the blocked assets in 
satisfaction of their claims. 
When a U.S. bankruptcy court “recognizes a foreign main 
proceeding under chapter 15, section 1520(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that actions against the foreign debtor or ‘property of 
the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’ 
are” subject to the automatic stay.159 A “foreign main proceeding” is a 
 
159 Chapter 15 Recognition Mandatory and Fully Encumbered Assets Are “Property 
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proceeding pending in a country where the debtor’s “center of main 
interests” are located, whereas a “foreign non-main proceeding is a 
proceeding in a country where the debtor has an establishment, but 
not its ‘center of main interests.’”160 The proceeding of In re Banco 
Continental would be considered a foreign main proceeding because 
the liquidation of Banco Continental is being carried out in Honduras, 
which is the principal place of business for Banco Continental.161 Thus, 
the pending proceeding Bantrab has filed in the Southern District of 
Florida is located where the “center of main interests” for Banco 
Continental is located. 
The question then becomes are the Wells Fargo accounts still 
the property of Banco Continental and are they subject to the 
automatic stay? The Department of the Treasury answers this question 
by stating that the assets are merely blocked or “frozen” and that these 
terms are merely connoting “a way of controlling targeted 
property.”162 Ultimately, the title of the frozen property is still with the 
target of the OFAC sanctions.163 “Blocking immediately imposes an 
across-the-board prohibition against transfers or dealings of any kind 
with regard to the property.”164 
The court could lift the automatic stay pursuant to section 
362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. This is a long shot because the court 
would have to find “cause” to lift the stay, which is typically a good 
faith filing balancing test involved in single-asset real estate cases.165 
This is a high bar and one not likely met in the present case. 
Eventually, the parties reached a private settlement. OFAC 
delisted the five organizations, including Banco Continental, that were 
a part of the Rosenthal Money Laundering Organization from their 
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act designation dating back to 
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October 2015.166 The United States Department of the Treasury found 
that “[f]ollowing OFAC’s designation, Honduran authorities seized or 
took control over multiple entities and properties owned by the 
Rosenthal [Money Laundering Organization].”167 The Treasury 
further explains that the “delisting serves as a successful example of 
the ultimate goal of the Administration’s use of sanctions as a tool – to 
bring about a positive change in behavior.”168 
This delisting of the money laundering organizations signifies 
that “all property and interests in property, which had been blocked 
solely as a result of these designations, are unblocked and all otherwise 
lawful transactions involving U.S. persons and these entities and 
individuals are no longer prohibited.”169 As stated earlier, this de-
listing does not retroactively affect the disposition of the South Dakota 
Garnishment Action, but with the complicated litigation that would 
follow, a settlement comes as no surprise. The parties came together 
and negotiated a split to the assets, which was approved by the courts 
and parties involved.170  Issue 3 of the “Strategic Plan for Federal 
Judiciary” is titled “The Effective and Efficient Management of Public 
Resources.”171 This settlement furthers the policy encouraging the 
efficient use of judicial resources by honoring an out of court 
settlement all parties freely enter into and providing an expedient and 
seemingly fair ending to an interesting ordeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the United States’ laws providing for the 
attachment of blocked assets linked to terrorism creates a “race to the 
courthouse” that favors a few creditors. Congress was briefed on the 
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170 Order, Wells Fargo v. Caballero, No. 20-cv-20868-CMA (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 
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171 Issue 3: The Effective and Efficient Management of Public Resources, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/issue-3-
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2021 ANTONIO CABALLERO: TWO CONFLICTING U.S. LAWS 355 
matter in congressional hearings and were satisfied with that process 
for holding terrorism-linked entities accountable. However, it is 
unclear what alternatives to the “race to the courthouse” are available. 
The terrorism victims’ garnishment actions serve Congress’s goal of 
punishing those who would aid terrorist activities. 
Unfortunately, the settlement deems many of the intriguing 
questions moot. But in law this is often the case until another, similar 
case hits a federal docket. Bankruptcy lends itself to out of court 
settlements, and in the name of judicial economy is the preferred 
outcome.172 Moreover, collecting against terrorist parties is a difficult 
proposition, whether locating funds or being the first to attach them. 
For terrorism judgment creditors, even small victories are still 
victories. 
 
172 See e.g., United States v. Hartog, 597 B.R. 673, 680 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
